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is -the only jurisdictional step in an appeal from the court of common
pleas to the court of appeals. Consequently, the fact that Revised
Code section 2505.05, which sets forth requirements of the notice, provides
for amendment of the notice after the filing of the notice in only one
situation, does not preclude amendment in another situation, the statute
being remedial in nature and, therefore, of a type which should be liberally
construed.
Several minor amendments to Revised Code sections 2321.05,
2505.08, 2505.21, and 2505.36, all of which have to do with various steps
in appellate procedure, were adopted by the General Assembly and became
effective during the year 1955. Revised Code section 2505.30 was also
amended to provide specifically that a court of appeals shall state on the
record conclusions of fact -found separately from conclusions of law, if a
party makes application for such finding prior to the filing for journaliza-
tion of a final order, judgment or decree.
In a timely and thoughtful address to the Toledo Bar Association on
December 15, 1955, published in January, 1956,10 Mr. Ross W. Shumaker
of the Toledo Bar, discussed the subject of the adoption in Ohio, either in
whole or in part, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Shumaker
submits that a considerable number of the federal rules probably provide
more efficient and effective background for practice than do similar rules
of practice under the appropriate Ohio Revised Code sections, but he points
out that Ohio lawyers will differ sharply with respect to the desirability
of adopting all of the federal rules in lieu of the codified sections of the
Revised Code which govern trial and appellate procedures. He suggests
that possibly the solution of the problem may lie in restoring to the courts
the right and power to make their own rules, and urges Ohio lawyers to
study the methods used and work done by the committees of the American
Bar Association which resulted in enactment by the Congress of the
United States of a statute which returned the rule-making power to the
courts, under the provisions of which legislation the federal rules of proce-
dure, both civil and criminal, have been formulated.
CLARE D. RUSSELL
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Several decisions appearing in print during the period covered by this
survey dealt with the practice of law itself, which -have led the editors of
this survey for the first time in its history to include a separate section
dealing with them.
'
0XXIX OHIO BAR 43 (1956).
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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW-- 1955
The Active Practice of Law
Section 1901.06 of the Revised Code provides in part that a municipal
judge " ... shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state
and shall have been actively engaged in the practice of law as his principal
occupation for at least five years" prior to taking office. In State ex rel.
Flynn v. Board of Elections of Cuyahoga County' it was held that a candi-
date for -the office of municipal judge who was admitted to the practice of
law in 1925 and was employed on a full-time basis as a referee of the Cleve-
land Municipal Court from 1927 until 1954, and whose dudes as such
referee consisted of hearing proceedings after judgment such as executions
and garnishments, settlement matters, motions and demurrers, and whose
decisions in all of these were technically, although in most instances not
actually, approved by a judge, for which he was" at all times paid a stated
salary and in which employment he had civil service status, did not meet
both of these statutory requirements and was not entitled to have his name
on the ballot at a non-partisan election for a full term on the municipal
bench. This was despite the relato's contention that he had also under-
taken and completed legal consultations, drafted papers and advocated
causes before the probate and common pleas courts insofar as was not
in conflict with his duties in or -the -rules of the court in which he had
been referee.
It seems to the author that the Supreme Court's application of the
statute was unnecessarily strict. The purpose of the statute, it may be
suggested, is to insure the election of a qualified and experienced judge,
rather than an untrained layman or a recently admitted lawyer. If legal
experience is the criterion for eligibility, then relator seems to have it to a
high degree. Apart from the technical prohibition of the statute, one is
moved to ask whether quo warranto proceedings would lie if such an ex-
perienced referee were appointed by the Governor to fill out an unexpired
term of office.
The case is also of interest in its treatment of another question, viz.,
whether the Board of Elections, in determining whether the candidate had
the statutory qualifications, was exceeding the powers conferred by law
upon it, and whether the Legislature in prescribing conditions of eligibility
for the office was attempting to exercise any judicial power.2 Both ques-
tions were of course answered in the negative.
Contempt in the Presence of the Court
A certain lawyer had a substantial practice making collections for
small-loan and finance companies and merchants who sold on credit and
164 Ohio St. 193, 129 N.E.2d 623 (1955).
1OH1o CONST. Art. I, § 16; Art. IV, § 1.
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took promissory notes from their customers as security. He therefore
frequently had occasion to secure judgments on cognovit notes and to
resort to garnishment proceedings to collect his clients' judgments. For
some reason which is not dear, and for none which any reasonable person
can justify, he resorted to signing the name of fictitious "John Charleston"
to various pleadings filed by himself, such as, for example, upon affidavits
as to military service of defendants, service of statutory demands on
debtors, and aids in execution. The attorney seems also then to have
signed his own name as a Notary Public, asserting -that the said affidavits
were -in fact sworn to before him by the fictitious "Charleston." It was
admitted by the attorney that there was no such person as "John Charles-
ton" and that the attorney was responsible for the signatures, made either
by himself or by personnel in his office or by his clients at his instance.
Section 2705.01 of the Revised Code provides that a court or a judge
in chambers may summarily punish any person guilty of misbehavior in
the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice.
In the principal case8 it was held that such a filing of papers with
affidavits signed with a fictitious name is a fraud on the court, constitutes
misconduct in the court's presence, obstructs the due administration of
justice and may properly be punished summarily and without citation of
the attorney responsible or the filing of charges against him.
The court could hardly have reached any other conclusion than it did.
Its opinion is also valuable for 'the court's citation of other similar cases in
Ohio and elsewhere.
Champerty and Maintenance
In addition to the Ten Commandments there are three other ancient
"'Thou Shalt Nots" for lawyers. Thou shalt not stir up litigation, thou
shalt not purchase an interest in thy client's law suit, and thou shalt not
niaintain thy client. Barratry,4 champerty5 and maintenance6 are all recog-
nized and forbidden by the Canons of Legal Ethics. All three of these
offenses were indictable at common law.7
The court of appeals had before it in LoGuidice v. Harris8 a most in-
teresting problem involving what appear to have been unintentional
8 Fidelity Finance Company v. Emory Harris and Delbert S. Cohon, and nine other
cases, all at 71 Ohio L Abs. 309, 126 N.E.2d 812 (1955).
'CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmIcs OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssociATioN § 28.
8 d. at § 10.
* Id. at § 42.
"See 11 A.B.A.J. 735 (1925).
898 Ohio App. 230, 128 N.E.2d 842 (1954).
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violations of these prohibitions. One Harris was employed by LoGuidice
and others, partners. He sustained injuries, allegedly in the course of his
employment and filed a claim with the Industrial Commission for com-
pensation. His employers were noncomplying employers under the Work-
men's Compensation Act.9
The Industrial Commission found that Harris was not an employee of
the partnership within the meaning of the act and disallowed his claim.
Harris then filed a "petition in the nature of an appeal" in the common
pleas court. The partners answered this petition, raising several defenses
to liability.
Prior to the trial of -the case -in common pleas, Harris' attorneys exe-
cuted an agreement with the partnership defendants that in consideration
of the court's entering a decree to the effect that Harris, the employee, was
entitled to participate in the benfits of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
his attorneys would save the employer partnership harmless from all lia-
bility which might arise by reason of any award to their client by the
Industrial Commission and which might be charged to defendant em-
ployers. Harris then signed a release to his employers. The court then
signed a consent decree in favor of Harris and found him to be entitled to
participate in the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act, also
awarding attorney's fees to his attorneys. Subsequently, pursuant to this
decree, the Industrial Commission made an award and payment to Harris.
Since Harris' employers were noncompliers, the Industrial Commission
then sued them for the amount of the award paid to Harris and the fee
paid to his attorneys. This turn of events, it may be hazarded, was probably
not contemplated at the time when the employers suffered judgment
to go against them. The Commission recovered judgment, which the em-
ployers were compelled to pay. They thereupon sued Harris' lawyers on
the indemnity agreement which had been entered into at the time of the
consent decree in common pleas court.
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the unhappy employers
against the now unhappy lawyers. The court of appeals unanimously re-
versed and entered final judgment for the lawyers. It based its decision
on two grounds, with the first of which we are concerned in our professional
relations and conduct as lawyers. This, said the court, is a champertous
contract. It avoids the evil of maintenance, in that the lawyers apparently
did not bear the cost and expenses of Harris' suit, but, by agreeing ith
the other side -that it should not ultimately suffer for defaulting to their
client, the attorneys were in effect receiving a part of the proceeds in the
event of a favorable determination of the lawsuit. "Champerty" is from
9 OMo REV. CODE § 4123.01 et seq.
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the Latin phrase, "campum partire" - to divide -the field - and an at-
torney who buys into his cient's lawsuit is dividing the field with his
client.' 0 Just how the court reached this conclusion is not dear to this
writer. The situation is not like that of an agreement with the client that
he shall not settle his claim without the consent of the attorney," nor is
it like the case of the assignment by the client of his claim, in whole or
in part, to the attorney.'2  The situation is complicated by the fact that in
the action in common pleas court by the employer on appeal from the
Industrial Commission the employer is a nominal defendant. If the em-
ployer loses it is the Commission which will have to pay, and it is only
when, as in this case, the employer is a noncomplier that the Commission
will have an action against him to recover what it has paid on 'his behalf.
That such an agreement is against public policy is probably the basis of
the court's decision. It suggests that perhaps the parties agreed as they
did on the theory and in the hope that the Commission would fail to
assert its lawful claim against the partners, but that the employers' counsel
were unwilling to take this gamble and so procured the indemnity agree-
ment.
The really surprising denouement, however, is that since the agree-
ment is against public policy, the court refuses to enforce it in any way,
and leaves the parties where it found them. Thus a champertous agree-
ment, illegal as to lawyers, becomes almost a sword in their hands, rather
than a shield to the layman. They are permitted to keep their improper
gains. This must be on the basis that -the parties, laymen, and lawyers, are
in pari delicto. Usually, in such situations the courts do not hold the
layman to be equally in delicto with the lawyer.18, 14
We are led to ponder and pose this further question: the employers
were represented by their own counsel when they accepted the worthless
indemnity from Harris' lawyers. May they now sue their counsel for
misfeasance? Their advice turned out pretty badly.
"A proper contingent fee excepted, of course, CANONs OF PROFESsIoNAL ETHICS
OF THE A.B.A. § 13.
1 Davy v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 78 Ohio St. 256, 85 N.E. 504 (1908).
"Stewart v. Welch, 41 Ohio St. 483 (1885).
CHEATHAM, CASES AND MATERIALs ON THE LEGAL PROFEsSIoN 529-530 (2d
ed. 1955).
"
4The court also discusses the provisions of the compensation act and the cases de-
cided under it which forbid an employer, self-insurer or otherwise, from seeking
indemnity or insurance against loss or liability for payment of compensation to work-
men. OHIO REv. CODE § 4123. Perhaps it would have been better to have placed
the decision solely on this point. It certainly affords a clear and unequivocal basis
for reaching an identical result.
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Degree of Proof Required in Disbarment Proceeding
During the past year the Supreme Court settled the question as to the
degree of proof required in a disbarment case, holding that it is only that
of a preponderance of the evidence.15 While the verdict in such a case is
"guilty" or "not guilty," the proceeding is civil in character and of a law
rather than a chancery nature.
The court further held that evidence of a prior suspension of the at-
torney is admissible in a subsequent hearing on charges of professional
misconduct. Since the purpose of disbarment proceedings is not to punish
the offending lawyer, but to protect the public, the courts and the legal
profession, a prior suspension may indicate whether discipline of that
nature has been effective to afford such protection and to reform the
attorney and to enable the court now hearing the charges to determine
what will be most effective in the future.
Representation of Adverse Interests
Constructive Contempt
Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states in part 'that"... It
is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express con-
sent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts ...... A
novel situation involving this rule of conduct was presented for decision
by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County in Iz Re Estate of WilliamA. Wfvight. 16
One P., an attorney, was named by the Probate Court as administrator
of the estate of William A. Wright, deceased. While serving as such,
prior to completion of administration, without resigning his commission
as administrator, and without first informing the court and without ob-
taining the court's consent, he entered into an oral agreement with one
William (no initial) Wright, a first cousin of the decedent, to represent
him in establishing the latter's claim to be the sole heir at law to the estate
of decedent. This sole 'heirship was not apparent at the time of the con-
tract, and was not, in fact, established until the conclusion of proceedings
to determine heirship, instituted by Attorney P. as administrator, and in
which Attorney P. also represented his new dient, William (no initial)
Wright.
P. submitted no claim for extraordinary compensation for serving both as
administrator of the estate and as attorney for the administrator. He did
receive the administrator's statutory commission and was paid a fee by the
heir whom he successfully represented.
'lo ra Disbarment of Lieberman, 163 Ohio St. 35, 125 N.E.2d 328 (1955).
" 123 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio App. 1954).
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